105

CHAPTER 2

UNITIVE REASONING
(Samkhya Yoga)

When we scan this chapter it is striking to note first of all that Arjuna's conflict is
carried over from the previous chapter, where we should normally have expected it to
terminate. The literary device of a Samjaya talking to a Dhritarashtra is again
introduced. Krishna himself tries to arouse Arjuna from his apparent inertia or lethargy
by sharp stinging expressions; but Arjuna, instead of being cowed down by them,
justifies himself further in a manner that reflects a certain state of abandonment. The
metrical change in verses 5 to 8 indicates this. This is usual throughout the work
wherever it rises to a pitch of rhapsody, where factors of feeling dominate. Arguments
as such are thrown into the background. The rishi (sage-seer) style as found in the
Vedas comes into evidence unmistakably.
Here the structure of the verses attains a new dialectical perfection, reciprocal
expressions being used with a striking symmetry, neutralizing factors or values into a
vague sense of wonder of the numinous. Arjuna himself thus attains a new status in this
chapter, as a representative contemplative disciple who belongs to the Guru-sishya
context proper. The word sishya (disciple) is expressly used to refer to this new status
in verse 7.
In verse 8 the nature of Arjuna's doubt is no longer mistakable. He says categorically
that nothing on this earth nor in heaven will cure him of his painful conflict. He is not
unlike Nachiketas of the Katha Upanishad who refuses boons belonging to the relativist
world. In fact the structure of all the Upanishads reveals the same initial attitude of a
disciple in one form or another. Arjuna's conflict, condition and attitude are no
exception. From the mere emotion of the first chapter, here in the second chapter it
attains the status of a philosophical doubt which he himself is quite capable of stating
consciously and precisely in conformity with other shastras (textbooks).

106
The nature of his sorrow is such as to dry up the indriyas or senses collectively. He is
numbed or dazed intellectually, while in the previous chapter his mouth was parched
and he was trembling. We should understand from the difference between Arjuna in
these two phases in these two chapters, that the author in this second chapter enters into
the subject proper. This is where the Gita-Acharya (teacher) begins the role of a Guru,
instead of being merely a charioteer who brings Arjuna's chariot into the midst of the
ranged armies.
Krishna's role as an acharya is thus inaugurated properly with verse 11. The smile on
his lips in verse 10 is characteristically in contrast with the pessimistic state of Arjuna
who is gloomy and pensive. Between this bright smile and the tedium vitae is to take
place presently a normal dialectical revaluation of wisdom values.
The value under the caption Samkhya (rationalism) is what is indicated as the general
overall concluding title of this chapter. But we find that verse 39 draws a line between
two distinct parts of the chapter itself. This, however, is no objection, as the first part is
a revaluation of Samkhya (heterodox rationalist school) in terms of Yoga, and the
second part is called buddhi yoga (rationalism treated again dialectically, i.e. as a yoga).
Buddhi yoga, which in essence is also rational, is here also stated in revalued terms as a
yoga. This intriguing term will be defined later in this chapter. The title Samkhya Yoga
(Unitive Reasoning) for the whole chapter is therefore not unjustified. If we should
expect to find the pure Samkhya of Kapila in the earlier part of the chapter, we shall be
disappointed. This has been a fecund cause of confusion on the part of several critics of
the Gita (e.g. Edgerton and Raju) who discredit the Gita as a systematic treatise on this
score. The Gita has an inner structure of its own, and each chapter (as we have stated in
the Introduction) has its own frame of reference.
A growing number of Western professors, among whom must be included many of
their disciples who happen to be Indians, make the inexcusable error of thinking that the
Gita is a theistic religious classic rather than a philosophical treatise, a smriti (code of
laws as of Manu, Yajnavalkya, Parashara, etc.) or dharma-shastra (textbook of social
obligations) rather than a shruti (revealed wisdom-utterance) or upanishad (wisdom-
teaching of a Guru).
When the discussion or samvada which is a philosophical discourse between Guru and
sishya opens properly in this

107
second chapter, such a view is glaringly belied, for here we see that the discussion
enters into the very heart of rationalism which is philosophy and cannot possibly be
conceived to be either theological or religious in the plain meaning of these terms. Full
examination of the other chapters will enable us to establish firmly the fact that the Gita
is first and foremost a philosophical work and that the references to matters of religious
practice are only incidental and non-obligatory, covering aspects of applied wisdom
only.
Samkhya (rationalism) when treated unitively attains the status of a yoga, and buddhi
(pure reason), when employed to reconcile counterparts, also attains to the same yoga
status. That samkhya and yoga are the same has been plainly stated in v, 4-5. No
possible doubt should remain about this as far as the author Vyasa's attitude towards the
two schools is concerned.

1
Samjaya uvacha
tam tathi kripaya vishtam
asrupurnrakulekshanam
vishidantam idam vakyam
uvacha madhusudanah

Samjaya said:
To him who was thus filled with tenderness (kripa)whose eyes were filled with tears,
and agitated and who was in distress, the Destroyer of Madhu (Krishna) spoke these
words:

Kripaya avishtam: The usual meaning given is that Arjuna was "overcome with pity ".,
We should notice that the phrase kripaya paraya vishto has already appeared in. i, 28.
The kripa, "pity", there has sometimes been interpreted as kripaya-aparaya "non-
transcendental pity"- correctly enough according to the rules of Samskrit grammar -
but we need not stretch the meaning so far to see the distinction implied between the
qualified kripa of the first chapter and the plain kripa here. Further, the word comes
from the same root from which the word karpanya  "negative state of spirit"in 11, 7 is
derived. If we note further the expression in ii, 49 - kripanah phalahetavah (end-
motivated persons are poor), we can see that the term is used irrespective of the subject
or object of pity. Here in this

108
verse it is unqualified pity as distinct from pity for relations in an actual historical
context as in Chapter i. This difference will become more definite philosophically with
the words of Arjuna in the next verse.
Here the emotion of Arjuna undergoes some slight sublimation as we can see by
comparison with i, 47. There he is just obstinate; here he melts into tears. The process
of sublimation later on enables him to formulate his inner conflict in the form of a
finalized doubt in verse 6, supported by a variety of dialectics of his own so masterfully
enunciated in verse 5. The visible aspects of Arjuna's inner conflict are graphically
described in the phrase asrupurnakulekshanam (with both eyes agitated and filled with
tears). He has become immobile here in all other respects except for his eyes. This
detailed description makes him stand on the threshold of a truly contemplative life, as
the agitation of the eyes being due to doubt only, affiliates him more closely to the
context of contemplation.
The meaning of the vishada (conflict) should also be understood in the sense of being
nearer to a doubt than to any gross emotion.
Madhusudana (Slayer of Madhu) as applied to Krishna, balances with Arjuna here as a
non-combatant warrior in the field.

2
Sribhagavan uvacha
kutas tva kasmalam idam
vishame samupasthitam
anaryajustam asvargyam
akirtikaram arjuna

Krishna said:   
In (the midst of this) difficulty whence comes to you this dejection, typical of non-
Aryans (anarya), heaven-barring and disreputable, 0 Arjuna?
              
Here the double literary device at the beginning of this chapter, of Samjaya reporting
the actual dialogue in verse 1 and again in verse 9, as if the curtain drops and rises twice
before the actual dialogue - the central samvada proper which is to hold the stage -
which begins properly in verse 11, has its own significance. It is in the light of this
dramatic structure

109

that we must interpret the meaning of verses 2 and 3 particularly; otherwise the second
line here which refers to factors such as svarga (heaven) and kirti (social reputation)
and anaryajushtam (unworthy of an Aryan, implying racial prestige) - generally
repugnant to the teaching of the Gita as a whole, as definitely discerned in later chapters
- become inexplicable.
The imperative need for action in this critical situation considered here in actual
historical terms belongs to the canvas rather than the painting. To identify it with the
proper teaching of the Gita as many have done (see our remarks on the realism of Sri
Aurobindo in the Introduction) is unpardonable.
The phrase anaryajushtam (dear to the non-Aryans) deserves pointed attention. From
history we know that the Aryans subjugated India by grabbing more and more lands.
The common amorphous matrix constituting the greater part of India proper has always
suffered from an over-generous attitude which amounts to a form of defeatism. Sri
Rama, the Aryanized king of Ayodhya, who penetrated southwards, was received
everywhere, even by Guha, not to speak of rishis and ashramites such as Shabari, with
great respect and cordiality instead of opposition, with offerings of roots and fruits. This
passive or negative attitude characterized India even at the time of the invasion of
Alexander, and has been confusing to the minds of all invaders ever since. We may
even consider that in recent history Gandhi's "passive fight" was too much for the
puzzled foreigners who have left India as much out of bewilderment as for any other
reason. Such negativism has been expressed in many ways. Some yogis taken to Rome
by conquerors are known to have publicly burned themselves to death. This marks the
limit of such a negativist attitude. This is the essentially non-Aryan character referred to
here.
Krishna is not opposed to this negative attitude, inasmuch as he preaches nivritti
marga, the via negativa or path of negation proper to contemplation; but he wants it to
be applied only in the domain of wisdom. In the field of action he employs ordinary
reasoning when action should be countered by its reaction in the ordinary sense. That is
why pointed reference is made here in this verse to the critical situation where the
attitude of Arjuna becomes completely out of place, when we take into account how
deeply Arjuna was actually involved or caught within the imperatively necessary
aspects of the situation. He did not realize that he had hardly any margin of choice left.

110
3
klaibyam ma sma gamah partha
nai 'tat tvayy upapadyate
kshudram hridayadaurbalyam
tyaktvo 'ttishtha paramtapa

Give not yourself to impotence, 0 Partha (Arjuna). It does not befit you. Cast off this
base faintheartedness; arise, 0 Terror of Foes!

Here Krishna further states his objections in piquant terms. He refers even to
faintheartedness with a view to goading Arjuna to action in the given situation,
although the epithet would hardly apply to the veteran hero. Krishna is not talking as a
Gita acharya here at all, but rather as a charioteer and friend who finds his master in a
confused plight, and therefore the further epithet kshudram (base), which would be too
much ordinarily to be applied to Arjuna, becomes permissible only in the light of
extreme familiarity and earnest interest in Arjuna as a friend. The word klaibyam
(impotent) is also too much, if not seen in the light of camaraderie.
Many persons who have written about the Gita have too easily taken the side of
Krishna here, and wanted, as it were, to pat Arjuna on the back patronizingly. This
privilege must be reserved for Krishna as a friend, or even for Krishna considered as a
Gita acharya. But for pandits, patriots and politicians, of the rank and file who are not
his comrades, to use this same patronizing tone towards Arjuna's attitude is, to say the
least, out of place, as Arjuna's position is superior to all of them, and inferior to Krishna
or a Guru of equal status only.

4
Arjuna uvacha:
katham bhishmam aham samkhye
dronam cha madhusadhana
ishubhih pratiyotsyami
pujarhav arisudana

Arjuna said:
How could I, 0 Slayer of Madhu (Krishna), encounter with arrows in battle Bhishma
and also Drona who are worthy of worship, 0 Slayer of Foes (Krishna) ?

111
The definite and precise reference here by name, first to Bhishma and then to Drona,
who are not Gurus in the same sense - Bhishma being only respected as a grandsire -
but both equally covered by the title "worthy of reverence", sharpens Arjuna's doubt to
a further degree. The instrument with which he is to fight them is also referred to; the
relevance being that it was Drona who taught him archery, and it was to Bhishma that
he could trace his physical prowess needed for archery. These factors, the arrows and
the two enemies, are looked upon as counterparts in the same plane of actuality, thus
paving the way for the argument in the next verse, which underlines the nature of the
dilemma in greater detail.
The prefix prati (against) is used to accentuate the duality implicit in the situation,
which seems to Arjuna to be absurd. It is in fact absurd to anybody, in the way Arjuna
puts it, and it can only be reasonable in a fully revalued way of absolutism implied in
xviii, 66 where all duties of relativist life are to be thrown away.

5
guran ahatva hi mahanubhavam
sreyo-bhoktum bhaikshyam api 'ha loke
hatva 'rthakamams tu gurun ihai 'va
bhunjiya bhogan rudhirapradighan

Desisting from the killing of the Gurus who are highly honourable, it would be more
meritorious in this world even to have to eat of a beggar's pittance. Choosing (on the
other hand) to kill these Gurus as fortune - seekers, I should be feasting even here on
blood-stained benefits of life.

This verse shows Arjuna as one who can employ dialectics with a vengeance, leading to
a doubly negative or unfavourable judgment. Duryodhana, who does not claim to be a
dialectician, can stand on simpler, plainer and firmer ground. Arjuna's difficulty, which
was hitherto stated strictly as within the domain of actuality that involved here-and-now
values only, is in this verse restated with one important difference, indicated by the
word sreyas (something morally or spiritually better) thus introducing for the first time
into the discussion a positive spiritual value-factor and not merely worldly advantage.
Even as such it does not refer to life hereafter as the repetition of iha (here) clearly
indicates. In fact it is Arjuna's

112
desire to be a better man even here itself which distinguishes him from Duryodhana. He
is an aspirant or a candidate for wisdom, though still a realist.
The metrical structure of this verse is meant to reveal an emotional content rising to the
pitch - though not of a rhapsody here - at least to that of a spiritual agony or angoisse.
The note of this agony is not unlike that of Yama (Death), the Guru in the Katha
Upanishad, who wailingly pleads with the sishya Nachiketas to dissuade him from
asking the final boon of all, respecting wisdom. There it is the Guru who wails, but it
makes no difference to the quality of the rhetorical mode employed, which is common
to both Guru there and sishya here
Another peculiarity to note about  this verse is that the same Gurus are referred to with
almost opposite titles. In one place they are called mahanubhavas (people of great
sympathy) and at another place arthakamaha (grabbers of goods). This would seem
paradoxical, and, except in the light of the special dialectical structure that we have
suggested, it would remain unresolved. In fact many have indeed mistranslated or
misinterpreted the word arthakamaha so as to twist it out of its shape to suit their
mechanistic way of thinking (e.g. it is translated  "well-wishers"by Bhagavan Das.)
The word iha (here) appearing in its simple form in the second line, appears again
repeated in the third line more emphatically as iha'eva (here itself) which cannot be
looked upon as accidentally inserted by the author Vyasa. It is just here that Arjuna's
dialectic fails to work as applied to value-factors, because both these value
components belong to a here-and-now order, but Arjuna has the excuse of speaking in
this chapter as an empiricist or just as a rationalist. As a correct sceptic ought to be, he
puts the question in its sharpest form as any practically-minded religious man even of
our own times - scrupulous of life here - might do.
In either of the alternatives, still treated dualistically by Arjuna after the manner of the
Nyaya-Vaiseshikas (logical- empiricists), or at best the Samkhyas (rationalists), the
result for him is in the form of an adverse verdict. He must either suffer poverty or
enjoy life with a sense of the guilt of having out-done a fellow-man. This doubly
negative result is characteristic of a form of reasoning which appears very subtle at first
sight, but is still tinged with the blemish of dualism - as Krishna will point out in due
course. According to Krishna who

113
is an absolutist, he is going to show how Arjuna can surmount his duality by the right
use of dialectics, by applying this method only to unitive values which come within the
scope of contemplation, and not merely for decisions between alternative advantages
here in the world of multiplicity and action. Dialectics is conducive to unitive
understanding only, and spoils the case when applied to ordinary situations in life
where usual ratiocinative methods or logic would be the proper instrument to employ.
It might be well also for us to note that the expression ahatva (not-killing) has an
artificial turn about it. The choice of killing or not-killing is either necessary or
contingent. Here, clearly,  "not-killing"is not enforced on Arjuna. It is a contingent
factor from which he derives the theoretical consequences of poverty, etc., which factor
and consequences are not directly connected as cause and effect. He is sentimental and
speaks like a theoretical philosopher when a practical necessity confronts him. It is on
this score that Krishna pulls him up quite readily in verse 11.
Arjuna may be said to resemble a man who has a telescope, but who looks through
the wrong end. Instead of ascending from the necessary to the contingent, he descends
from  factors which are not strictly of a necessary order to imaginary and conflicting
necessities. He is simply overwhelmed by a logic of emotions which goes always
contrary to the logic of pure reason, spoiling both natural spontaneity in emotion and
purity of reason.

6
Na chai 'tad vidmah kataran no gariyo
yad va jayema yadi va no jayeyuh
yan eva hatva najijivishamas
te 'vasthitah pramukhe dhartarashtrah

Neither is it clear which would be of greater advantage to us: that we win or that they
win over us. Killing whom we should no more wish to live, those very persons are
standing ranged before us, the progeny of Dhritarashtra.

The confounding of reason and emotion comes out here, each factor having equal force.
To add to the vagueness, there is the express use of the plural. He speaks now
apparently almost as a representative of both the contending parties - thus indirectly
thinking of the evils of war in most general terms.     

114     
His concern, however, to save humanity from the given effects of war, seems to
overleap itself when he again points to the sons of Dhritarashtra - as if he is concerned
more for them than for his own side, which commonsense should lead us to expect.
Actually we find him more concerned for his enemies. This is because his logic is
coloured by his emotions and he is carried beyond even the neutral ground of common-
sense to an extreme position untenable either from common-sense or contemplative
norms. His only excuse is perhaps that Bhishma and Drona, who belong to a spiritual
context, are both ranged against him. They represent spiritual values but happen to be on
the enemy side which already enjoys a majority.
najijivishama (we do not wish to live) - can only legitimately mean that he is concerned
with humanity who must be impoverished by the extermination of spiritual leaders or
Gurus. Note his plural again here by which he speaks for all, including his enemies and
Krishna himself.

7
karpanyadoshopahat vabhavah
prichchhami tvam dharmasammudhachetah
yach chhreyah syan nischitam bruhi tan me
sishyas to 'ham sadi mam tvam, prapannam

Struck down by the evil of a tender disposition, with a mind confounded in regard to
what is right to do, I ask you: that which is definitely more meritorious, that do indicate
to me. I am your disciple; do discipline me coming thus for refuge to you.

Now the style reverts to the singular. Here Arjuna is able himself to state clearly the
nature of his trouble: (1) that a negative state of mind has overtaken him and (2) that his
reason is therefore clouded about the choice before him. These are the two factors
involved. The cure for one is clearer reasoning (heterodox Samkhya yoga). For the other
the cure is the method of buddhi-yoga (orthodox rationalism treated unitively) which
would make him more Aryan and relieve him of the sense of sin. These exactly are just
the remedies to be applied by Krishna in the remainder of this chapter.                    
The word dharma (righteousness, connoting also inner tendencies to natural activity) is
used by Arjuna both in the sense

115
of  "conduct" as used by Buddhist writers, and in its purer psychological connotation.
Although a warrior's sense of honour is appealed to by Krishna. in verses 32-35 of this
chapter, the   main part of the chapter is concerned with rationalism of  an "objective"
order. The reference to honour, etc. fits into this chapter as the common-sense
counterparts or corollaries of a rational matter-of-fact attitude.
The word shreyah (spiritually meritorious) again indicates a superior human value
belonging to contemplative wisdom, especially when taken together with the word
sishya  (disciple) which makes him essentially not a warrior merely, but principally a
wisdom-seeker. Also the word sadhi (teach) helps to confirm this way of looking at the
situation. This is the cue for the samvada or Guru-sishya dialogue which is to hold the
stage.

8
na hi prapasyami mama 'panudyad
yach chhokamuchchhosanam indriyanam
avapya  bhumav asapatnam riddham
rajyam suranam api cha 'dhipatyam

I cannot visualize either what could rid me of this distress which dries up the senses in
this way - even should (it transpire that) I obtain unrivalled dominion of the earth's plenty
or overlordship of the gods in heaven too.

The resemblance of Arjuna, who is here an equally thorough-going wisdom-seeker, to
Nachiketas of the Katha Upanishad (to whom we have already referred) becomes
unmistakably evident here. He is for the first time referring to heaven and lordship over
the gods, which itself is strange inasmuch as till now he was thinking of negative factors
only. He who preferred to be a mendicant begging his way now also refers to the
uttermost limit of worldly prosperity. He rejects both of these possible futures because
they are only relative values, while he seeks merit in an absolute sense. As a disciple in
any other upanishad, the implications in this verse must make it indubitably clear to the
reader that the Gita is not concerned with conduct here, or even the relative heaven-
determined values of the Vedas, but only with ultimate or absolute factors of supreme
wisdom. Even the highest of the shining gods are to be left behind if Arjuna is to find
satisfaction. If Krishna

116   
refers in his teaching hereafter to Heaven and relativist values, they therefore become of
incidental importance only (e.g. verses xi. 32 and 37 mention heaven only for purposes
of methodology. We shall clarify this in due course. Enough to state here that this has
nothing to do with the final teaching of the Gita).
Like the third boon of Nachiketas, Arjuna is not going to be satisfied with anything
short of the highest wisdom, for he indicates here that only such wisdom can cure him
of his agony of spirit. This condition of Arjuna is not symptomatic of any known
pathological disease or psychological abnormality. It is only found expressed in such
Guru-sishya textbooks as the Vivekachudamani of Sankara - where the disciple
compares himself to an animal trapped in a raging forest-fire (verse 36).

9
Samjaya uvacha
evam uktva 'hrishikesam
gudakesah paramtapah
na yotsya iti govindam
uktva tushnim babhuva ha

Samjaya said:
Having spoken thus to Hrishikesa (Krishna), Gudakesa (Arjuna) the Terror of the Foe,
saying, "I will not fight"to Govinda (Krishna), lapsed finally into silence.

10
tam uvacha hrishikesah
prahasann iva bharata
senayor ubhayor madhye
vishidantam idam vachah

On this Hrishikesa (Krishna), with a semblance of smiling, 0 Bharata (Dhritarashtra),
spoke these words to him who was in grief between the two armies:

The Samjaya-Dhritarashtra device is used for these two verses only, for the express
purpose of setting the stage for the impending full-dress discourse which starts at verse
ii, from which point onwards it becomes fully philosophical.
These verses reveal the attendant circumstances in the actual world most delicately
counterpoised in every respect, thus forming the correct defined situation on firm
ground, upon

117
whose basis the theoretical discussion can proceed. To the extent that the questioner is
practically-minded, the answerer has to be downright conclusive in his reply. The
concrete question requires an apodictic reply. It is tit for tat.
Before the sweeping generalizations of Krishna follow, therefore, it is necessary to
review in a short span the ensemble of the situation. These two verses serve that very
purpose.
Hrishikesa and Gudakesa, balancing sound as well as meaning, suggest equality
between Guru and disciple. Reference is also made in favourite terms to senayor
ubhayor madhye (between two armies) to indicate the perfect neutrality of the absolutist
way of life preached by the Guru Krishna. The smile of a Guru is the only factor
differentiating him from the gloomy disciple.
Vachah (the word) is singular and not plural. This is most significant. All the words
used in the chapter are supposed to be upavikyanam (elaborations of one central Word),
the Verbum or Logos or the AUM as definitely stated in the Mandukya Upanishad. The
same singular is strikingly repeated in x. 1 and xi. 1. So this cannot be just the
accidental usage of the author, Vyasa.
Further, Arjuna definitely says "I will not fight "which hitherto he has not dared to say
to Krishna. It is this brazen attitude which should justify the oft-repeated words of
Krishna in later chapters, in which he seems to order Arjuna to fight. Although the Gita
is free from obligatory injunctions, this style of speech here arises incidentally from
Arjuna's words. To the extent that such an admonition is meant to counteract this
obstinacy, it is in place. But the main character of such advice should be understood as
permissive and never fully mandatory because vidhi or mandate is repugnant altogether
to an Upanishad which is a shruti (revealed utterance of wisdom) and not a smriti (code
of laws). Those who interpret such expressions as injunctions will find themselves
completely in the wrong by the time they reach the end of the Gita, wherein Krishna
finally says to Arjuna: "Do as you like "(xviii, 63) which, taken together with
"abandon all duties "(xviii, 66) makes the non-mandatory character of the reference to
fighting unequivocal. The various references to the subject of fighting will be dealt with
as occasions arise. The reader however, must watch out for a  gradation or change of
sense even in the permissive or advisory character according to the proper context of
each chapter.

118
Notice that Arjuna remains no whit less a warrior (Paramtapa "Consumer of Foes") in
spite of his being silent. It is still the silence of a great hero and not that of a coward.
His doubt belongs to the realm of wisdom and not to his physical prowess.
Sankara's long-drawn comment on this verse to establish that "knowledge alone, and
not by knowledge conjoined with works" is the conclusive teaching of the Gita, could
be taken for granted by us in the present commentary without any arguments, because
we look upon the Gita as a "dialectical revaluation" of wisdom into which obligatory
works do not enter at all. The Gita is not a Dharma Shastra or Smriti treating of
obligatory injunctions. Any reference to such in the Gita is incidental to the narrative or
discussion and is of a recommending or permissive character only and never of an
obligatory character.
The term iva (as if) applied to the smile of Krishna is a peculiarity of the lingua mystica
familiar in the Upanishads (e.g. Mundaka Upanishad, 1. 2 , 4-6) by which the edge is,
as it were, taken off the actuality of the description, tending to make it more perceptual
and thus more in keeping with a contemplative text.

11
Sribhagavan uvacha
asochyan anvasochas tvam
prajnavadams cha bhashase
gatasum agatasums cha
na 'nusochanti panditah

Krishna said:
You are sorry for those with whom sorrow is unreasonable. You speak in terms of
reason too. Veritable philosophers (pandits) are not affected in regard to those whose
breath has gone and those whose breath has not gone.

We begin the samvada (Guru-sishya dialogue on wisdom) noting straight away that it
starts off in no uncertain words. The position of a thorough-going absolutist is stated for
all it is worth, to be elaborated stage by stage afterwards.
The second line of this verse has been much misunderstood and misinterpreted,
seriously enough to vitiate and compromise

119
the whole message of the Gita in commentaries by people
who did not realize that the Gita is based on dialectical
reasoning and not on mere ratiocination.
Note the word cha (and) in this line which has invariably
been taken to be identical or interchangeable with va
(either-or). Though seemingly small, there is a world of
difference between the two meanings. The latter meaning
would be tantamount to upholding a model of a spiritual
man who is indifferent or cold-hearted when a person is
dead, while the former meaning, which conforms to the text
and is the only meaning possible here, supports a perfected
wise man or pandit who has transcended both the aspects of
life and death here, treated together, as inevitable dual sides
of our relative life here and now. The Gita preaches ahimsa
(non-hurting) in later chapters. Indifference in causing
death is not therefore compatible with the teaching of the
Gita at all. Gandhi's Gita commentary has made an effort to
make this clear by other evidences of his own, which has
left many people unconvinced. The delicate difference
implied in this opening verse when properly understood
would not require long-drawn arguments to bend the Gita to
support any special doctrine of ahimsa which is only a
natural corollary to the Gita's chief teaching of wisdom, as
we shall have ample occasion to see.
The word panditih refers expressly, not to a man of action
like Arjuna, but to men of wisdom, those who understand.
Between the two lines of this verse - the first one reflecting
necessity, the second one reflecting free contingency - the
argument will be seen like a pendulum, now swinging to the
one side or the other. The wide-awake student of the Gita
should not be too hasty or hurried in deriving rigid snap
judgments about what the Gita teaches from isolated verses
or lines -  as has been done so often.
Note that sorrow is the central consideration on which the
verse revolves. The concept of shoka (compassion) is the
spiritual value with which the dialogue begins. The disparity
between wisdom and sympathy, reason and emotion, is the
subject for reconciliation - the one in terms of the other,
retaining both unitively by yoga. The duality between the
two persists in Arjuna, producing a conflict or doubt which
constitutes the major problem of the Gita as a whole.
That Arjuna himself has strongly-rooted rival theories
about right and wrong, virtue and sin, is revealed in i.40-
45. Now that he seeks nothing short of absolute wisdom, as
revealed in ii. 8, it

120
is in reference to these two incompatible attitudes, one being
still relativist, the other belonging to wisdom, that Krishna
here speaks outrightly, pointing out the anomaly of Arjuna's
position.
In understanding the meaning of asochyan (those not to
be grieved for) we have to be guided by the indications in 
verse  5 above which refers to the Gurus, as well as by the
absolutist ideas which follow immediately in this chapter.
Sankara suggests that the reference applies to such people as
Bhishma and Drona and states "they deserve no grief for
they are men of good conduct and are eternal in their real
nature". Arjuna has enumerated in detail all those for whom
he is concerned in i. 34. Even if the two Gurus are exempt
from the pity normal to the situation, the case of all others
who include good, bad and indifferent persons on both the
sides (as explicitly mentioned in i. 27) is not covered by
Sankara's explanation. There is an over-all answer to the
question: "Who are the persons meant here as not deserving
or incapable of being sympathetically thought of?" which is
contained in this very chapter (verses 12 to 38 inclusive).
The same is again implied in xi. 33 where Krishna states
that the men have already been killed by him and his
(Arjuna's) killing is only incidental to the situation. This
type of over-all absolutist argument need be resorted to only
last of all. On the lines of Sankara's suggestion we could
think of two groups to whom the remark can possibly apply.
Those emancipated from necessity by their intelligence and
freedom of choice in action, like Bhishma and Drona who
have deliberately chosen the path of war, and those like the
rest of the rank and file caught helplessly in a general and
imperative war situation. The former can take care of
themselves and the latter cannot, even if they thought that
war was an evil.

12
na tv eva 'ham jatu na 'sam
na tvam ne 'me janadhipah
na chai 'va na bhavishyamah
sarve vayam atah param

Further, never was I non-existent, nor you nor these chiefs
of men; neither shall we, all of us, ever cease becoming
hereafter.

The initial line of argument adopted in this chapter is
clearly indicated here. It makes the absolutist position more

121
striking than in the second line of verse 11. It asserts at
once the eternal existence not only of the individual (or in
terms of a subjective soul), but of the whole group of
humanity involved. In fact the whole situation, as we shall
see shortly, is treated sub specie aeternitatis (under the
category of the eternal) as Spinoza put it. The reference to
the kings or chiefs of men as such, who are also, as it were,
to be considered eternal, seems to be asking too much for
us to believe. In so far as no king can really die ("The King
is dead, Long Live the King ") even this apparent exaggeration
becomes justified.
This chapter expressly faces the problem from an
apodictic or sharply matter-of-fact point of view. A bad
disease needs a drastic remedy. The rot of confusion has to
be stopped before it worsens. That is why the argument
plunges without apology into the heart of the problem. The
impossible character of the arguments thus become
understandable.
Note also that eternity is conceived both retrospectively
and prospectively. The inner logical or methodological order
maintained is striking. Krishna refers to himself first. Even
as plural entities human beings are to be treated in the light
of the eternal. The conflict between the one and the many
can be resolved in the light of higher reasoning as elsewhere
explained.

GENERAL NOTE ON verseS 13 TO 21

The approach of heterodox Samkhya is evidenced in these
verses but we should remember it is not Samkhya as Kapila
or even Ishvarakrishna presented it in the Samkhya Karika
that is here adhered to. The Gita restates Samkhya to suit its
own doctrine of the Absolute. In other words the Gita is a
dialectical revaluation in terms of yoga of pure Samkhya as
such, without omitting the technical terms belonging to
Samkhya method and not entirely breaking away from the
epistemological frame of reference proper to the Samkhya
system. We should look here for a Samkhya-yoga still
viewed from a heterodox angle, leaving the same to be
reviewed from an orthodox angle, with buddhi (pure reason
or intelligence) as a central value, in the second half of this
chapter, after verse 39, and thereafter to be known under the
caption of buddhi-yoga - buddhi there being not essentially
different from the Samkhya attitude. Both buddhi and
Samkhya therefore are
 
122
covered by the general title Samkhya-yoga without any real
contradiction, at the end of the chapter.  

13       
dehino 'smin yatha dehe
kaumaram yauvanon jara
tatha dehantarapraptir
dhiras tatra na muhyati

As there is here in the body for the embodied, childhood,
youth, old age, so also the passing on to another body
in the same manner; those firm in mind are not thereby
bewildered.

Let us focus attention on the word dehi (body-owner or
author-agent). It almost suggests some entity like Launcelot
Gobbo's conscience which hangs at the neck of his heart,
having an almost empirical status so repugnant to the way of
thinking of the Buddhist Vijnanavadins, and no less so even
with Advaitins of the Gaudapada school. The apparent
grossness here is explicable, since any theoretical discussion
of a subject implies its own purva pakshin (anterior sceptic)
and, in order to convince a person, one has to meet him on
his own terms with his own background. The empiricism
has to be met by an empirical attribute if it is to be revalued.
Rationalistic heterodox Samkhya tended to realism. When
the inner man had to be distinguished clearly from the
physical man, it became necessary for the Gita to employ
the word dehi (body-owner) with the same realism which
we find accentuated, until by verse 23 all vestiges of
materiality are abolished. But this abolition begins
significantly only after verse 22, which again is a kind of
rhapsody where realism and idealism merge, as it were,
bursting into song.
This verse recommends a view of reality in the form of a
flux pertaining to a general process of becoming. Childhood,
youth and old age are three stages known even to
realists, which are to be viewed, not statically, but as
flowing organically in terms of duration. Time itself is not
yet abolished.
Rebirth  is introduced as a natural consequence belonging
to the same order of flux or becoming. Metempsychosis is
therefore taken for granted as a natural corollary even of a
realistic and rationalistic attitude to life. The word dhira
here refers not merely to a brave man one a battlefield, but
perhaps

123
more aptly refers to one who is capable of taking a firm
stand in a contemplative context. He is a man of intuition
and imagination and not a mere ratiocinator.

14
matrasparsas tu kaunteya
sitoshnaskhaduhkhadah
agamapayino 'nityas
tams titikshasva bharata

Momentary sense contacts on the other hand, 0 Kaunteya
(Arjuna), yielding cold-warmth, joy-pain, alternately
coming and going, are transitory. Do you endure them, 0
Bharata (Arjuna).

15
yam hi na vyathayanty ete
purusham purusharshabha
samaduhkhasukham dhiram
so 'mritatvaya kalpate

That man indeed of firm mind who is unaffected by these, 0
Best of Men (Arjuna), equal-minded in joy as well as pain,
he is destined for immortality.

After stating the position of a man of intuition, verse 14
speaks of the opposite or counterpart - of reflexes and
automatisms belonging to physiology. Stimulus-response
psychology is involved here. Pleasure and pain, heat and
cold, belong to this order. This is the domain of sheer
necessity which no living being can escape. Arjuna is here
asked not to minimise their importance, as some vague
philosophers might do, or to learn to bear them stoically.
What cannot be cured must be endured.
Such a hardened and brave man, verse 15 indicates, almost
too hastily it might seem, is fit for "immortality", a term
usually applied only to the highest spiritual goal. But we
should note the reference to "pain" and "pleasure" as being
equalized before one qualifies for this immortality.
The modern stoic by definition has come to mean one of mere
brute endurance. But the yogi of the Gita who is referred to
here, is a man who enjoys as well as suffers with a certain
neutral attitude which cancels one against the other. This
makes all the difference for qualifying for immortality, even
in the fullest connotation of the term in Vedantic usage - as

124
one who has come to his full status as a yogi, equanimity
being a positive quality and not mere indifference.

16
na' sato vidyate bhavo
na' bhavo vidyate satah
ubhayor api drishto 'ntas tv
anayos tattvadarsibhih

What is unreal cannot have being and non-being can­not be real;
the conclusion in regard to both these has been known to
philosophers.

In this verse we have a clear enunciation of the methodology
adopted in the Gita. Terms like bhava and abhava (becoming
and non-becoming) are familiar to us in the Nyaya-Vaishesika
system of philosophy, where the term abhava (non-becoming)
is the last of the seven padarthas (categories of cognizable
en­tities).(1) Again, with reference to the word sat
(existence-reality) we should note it is not very different
from the notion of dravya (substance) used in the same system,
for even the mind is there considered as a substance. Substances
in this sense are considered as paramanu (atomic or exceedingly
refined prime matter). The word sat as employed in this verse
has, over and above the substantiality of the Nyaya-Vaishesika
context, some connotation of its own as reality understood in
neutral terms as between existence and non-existence. While the
cancelling-out of existence with non-existence might lead to
shunya or emptiness, the sat of the Vedanta of the Gita is meant
to represent the Absolute. The difference will perhaps become
clear if explained in mathematical terms; if we subtract two
equal quantities, thy answer is zero. But in the case of the
operation in the form of a fraction the result is not a zero
but a one (10 minus 10 = 0; 10/10= 1). The unitive Absolute
is similarly to be understood as different from the mere
nothing­ness which results from a mechanistic form of reasoning.
Unitive reasoning is based upon an intuitive or dialectical
awareness.
In the Gaudapada Karika (IV, 4 et seq.) reference is made
to the very problem implicit in this verse. Gaudapada takes
the
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
(1)See A Primer of Indian logic (According to Annambhatta's
Tarkasamgraha) by S. Kuppuswami Sastri (P. Varadachary &
Co.Madras, 1932). dravya-gun-a­karma-dvandva-samanya-vishesa
-samavayabhavah sapta padarthah: v.2, (substance, quality,
action, generality, speciality, inherence and non-becoming
are the seven cate­gories of cognizable entities).
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

125
case of two disputants - one a Vaishesika who argues that
there is no anterior cause to empirical reality, while the
other is a Samkhyan who says there is a cause which
regresses ad infinitum. Between these two disputants
nothing is decided about the final nature of reality. Sancerre
in his commentary seems to exploit the situation as an
argument in favour of a positive notion about Brahman (the
Absolute). Whether he legitimately succeeds in establishing
a positive Brahman on the basis of a mere disagreement
between these disputants is questionable. The Gita,
however, scores better than the Karika when it states here
that the disputants are not still disputing but have resolved
their disputes in terms of a finalized doctrine - the anta
(end) in the second line of this verse. This we can easily see
is the anta which is present in the Vedanta (Veda-anta) as it
is to be understood in the Gita.
There can be no question either in regard to the schools of
thought under reference here by the term tattvadarsibhih
(those capable of seeing first principles). The word tattva
(that-ness) is known to us even in the maha-vakyas (great
sayings) such as aum-tat-sat (Aum that is) or tat-tvam-asi_
(That thou art)- apart from its familiarity in the rationalistic
schools anterior to Vedanta, such as the Samkhya. Tattva
comes close to Kant's ding-an-sich (thing-in-itself) and
Spinoza's substantia (underlying Substantiality). This verse
satisfies itself for the present to leave this absolutist concept
open for further elaboration in this chapter, meeting
empirical requirements, while elsewhere other relevant
ways are dealt with.
The words ubhayor api (both taken together) have special
significance which we know as the distinguishing mark of
the methodology proper to dialectical or yogic reasoning,
(see P-49, Introduction). In the Isha Upanishad (1,1-14) two
striking examples occur, showing this same double-sided
method of reasoning. Sambhuti (becoming) and vinasha
(destruction or non-becoming) are to be understood
ubhayam saha (both taken together), i.e. not singly. Vidya
(knowledge) and avidya (nescience) are also treated in the
same way. Both pairs of opposites must be treated unitively
to bring out a central notion which pertains to the Absolute.
We know in the West also philosophers have been referring
to a one - legged argument or a lame excuse to mean
something untenable. The pros and cons have to be taken
together, the obverse and reverse of the same coin; these,
and many other phrases point to the same necessity in valid
thinking. This is the essential
        
126
distinguishing feature of dialectic or yogic reasoning,  
where intuition comes into play, rather than remaining         
merely logical in a factual manner. We shall find other
expressions like api cha (also, and) scattered throughout the
Gita text. These are not necessary requirements of syntax, if
the reasoning is merely mechanistic, but they do become
essential only for delicate dialectical purposes. Most
translators treat this distinction in a casual manner, because
they are unconscious of the difference between the two
styles - the merely rational and the dialectical ways of
exposition. In Bhagavan Das' Introduction to the Gita he
refers to the profuse use of such expressions as superfluous
and as having no significance (The Bhagavad-Gita, P. 36,
3rd ed., 1940).
The difference is not to be lightly brushed aside in view
of the finalized doctrine which must emerge from the
method employed. Passing through the vicissitudes of the
shunyavada and the vijnanavada (doctrines of emptiness
and subjective idealism) as understood in the Jaina or
Buddhist contexts, theories of reality have been formulated
in the history of post - Buddhistic thought in India. Some
have attained to rationalism, others to idealism within the
philosophies such as the Nyaya-Vaishesika and Samkhya-
Yoga schools. The last vestige of merely academic or
scholastic asymmetry became progressively adjusted and
rounded off. Shunyavada, Kshanika- Vijnanavada and
Mayavada may be said to mark the successive stages of the
perfection of this doctrine, but even in Mayavada vestiges
of duality persist, as between sat and asat (authentic
existence and non-authentic existence) - as a reaction
against the supposed nihilism in Buddhist doctrines. Here in
the Gita, however, we catch up once again with the spirit of
the Upanishads, more ancient than all these schools of
thought, where wisdom again attains its primal sublimity
as a song.

17
avinasi tu tad viddhi
yena sarvam idam
tatam vinasam avyayasya'sya
na kaschit kartum arhati

Know That to be indestructible by which all this
is pervaded. None can bring about the destruction
of This that knows no decrease.            

127  
18
antavanta ime deha
nityasyo 'ktah saririnah
anasino 'prameyasya
tasmad yudhyasya Bharata

These bodies (however) of the everlasting indestructible
and undefinable embodied (One) are spoken of as having
an end. Therefore go on with the battle, 0 Bharata (Arjuna).

These two verses must be taken together. Treated apart,
they lend semblance of support to conflicting doctrines.
In fact many commentators have derived both unethical and
non-spiritual doctrines from expressions contained here,
and especially from the last words of verse 18, tasmad
yudhyasva bharata (therefore fight, 0 Bharata).
Truisms and absurdities are equally derivable from the
sense of these two verses put together. To derive a
consistent way of life from the words of the Gita requires
its understanding in unitive terms where equivocation or
quibbling becomes impossible. We must try to enter into
what the author Vyasa himself wants to say before hastily
foisting our own favourite doctrines on disjunct sayings
lifted from the total context.
There are two extremities or poles to be distinguished in
these verses. verse 17 refers to an aspect of the human spirit
corresponding to the purusha - (spirit) of the Samkhya
which is altogether above prakriti (phenomena or nature).
This cannot be touched by any activity of man. At the other
extreme there is the pole corresponding to prakriti which is
recognized by samkhya and even commonsense as antavanta
(having an end). These two poles belong unitively to one and
the same atma (Self) - as implied in the phrase nityasya uktah
(said to be belonging to the eternal).
Although not strictly in conformity with samkhya doctrines
which retain their dual character; yet in the light of more
ancient Vedic tradition, with which the Gita wishes to
maintain unbroken continuity, the expression uktah (said to
be) is fully justified. Monism is well known in the Rig-Veda
(e.g. I, 164: 46: "Him who is the One existent, sages name
variously".
The expression "Therefore fight, 0 Bharata" which
seems to be an order given to Arjuna, deserves our attention
because it is perhaps the basis of the greatest amount of
misunderstanding in connection with the Gita. Some say the
Gita wants

128
everybody to fight for their own interests, national,
religious, etc. Others, like Sankara, though understanding it
as permissive only, think that  the advice is legitimate in the
case of a kshatriya (warrior). It is clear that war takes a
very imperative character when we take the particular
instance of Arjuna as an individual caught in those
necessary circumstances so carefully mentioned in great
detail by Vyasa in this and the previous chapter. If, because
of its imperative character as applied to the particular
Arjuna, the converse generalization leading to justification
of violence or war as a guiding principle for the regulation
of human affairs could derive support from the Gita
teaching remains very problematic indeed. It is often
forgotten that the rare quality called true Kshatriya-hood of
the Gita mentioned in xviii, 43 has to tally with its outer
corresponding counterpart called a righteous war in ii, 31,
so that war in that rare and very occasionally remote
contingency becomes the  "open door to heaven"
mentioned in ii, 32 . Without just war a Kshatriya could be
a Don Quixote and the fight itself an absurd rioting by a
plundering rabble.
The balance between the infinite One of verse 17 and the
finite Many of verse 19 has to be struck in a manner in
keeping with the perfect symmetry which is maintained here
between the two verses. The first verse refers to the
helplessness of man, and the second verse carries the same
argument further to its simple and natural consequence. The
necessary side of life has its own proper imperatives which
are categorical. We are all caught in necessity and are
obliged to act. Even Socrates had to go to the battlefield
(vide Symposium, 219-220).
Arjuna is asked to fight so that he may not set in motion
a sequence of disasters, major or minor, personal or
impersonal. His own reputation, as we shall see, is
involved. Krishna is interested, above all, that his friend is
saved from personal regression or regret amounting to a
moral or spiritual death as Arjuna.
Note that only here (and in XI, 34 for other reasons) is
this mandatory form of advice stated so clearly. Elsewhere
it is watered down gradually into expressions such as 
"Stand up, 0 Bharata!",  "Conquer your enemy, called
desire, 0 Bharata!", "Therefore do not regret", etc. The
mandatory form is fully justified here when we note that, in
conformity to the samkhya frame of reference, the two poles
of the spirit are kept here as strictly apart as possible within
a truly Vedantic context, retaining the fullest degree of
ambivalence permissible.

129
The Ramanuja school of dualism proves that these two
aspects are admissible within a unitive notion of the
Absolute. The necessary and contingent aspects that belong
to the central notion of the Absolute of this chapter, which
begins by accentuating the duality implied, will be brought
more unitively together in later chapters, and then the
obligatory tone of the instruction to fight will be seen to be
modified according to each chapter as indicated above. The
mandatory character is most apparent in this verse and in
xviii, 59. In the central chapters there is no mandate form
resorted to at all. The mandate here is therefore due to the
structure of the Gita as a whole.
The third-personal usage ("anyone ") employed at the
end of  verse 17 is correctly counterbalanced by the word
"Bharata" which applies to the particular person Arjuna
at the end of verse 18.
The word dehah (bodies) of verse 18 also refers to the
quantitative or numerical aspect as against sarvam  idam
(all this) of verse 17. "Bodies", therefore, are looked upon
as necessary cannon-fodder, as is inevitable in one form or
another in this world of transitory events. Arjuna is only a
cog in the wheel caught in the scheme of necessity, and the
sooner he realizes this, the better for him. This truth is
repeated in xviii, 61. Unnecessary friction could thus be
avoided. Anyone therefore who construes this reference to
fighting as an injunction as in a smriti (code of laws or
conduct) will be mistaking its purpose, which is only
philosophical. Any vestige or doubt on this score will be
finally abolished when this reference is read with xviii:
"Having reflected, act as you like"

19
ya enam vetti hantaram
yas chai 'nam manyate hatam
ubhau tau na vijanito
na'yam hanti na hanyate

He who thinks This as the killed and he who thinks This as
killed - both these know not. This does not kill; is not killed.

This verse modifies the supposed mandate of verse 18 by
stating that Arjuna is not killing at all when he is  asked
to kill there - thus heightening the paradoxical effect, with
the object of resolving the ambivalence in more unitive
terms.

130                  
The word ubhau (both together) occurs again here,
underlining the dialectical method of reasoning fully
employed here. Counterparts are brought more closely
together, with all the reciprocal implications. Finally the
seal of unitive thinking is stamped on the whole argument
in the last phrase: "This does not kill, is not killed",
bringing us normally to the wonder referred to in verse 29,
for which the ground is being prepared.

20
na jayate mriyate va kadachin
na 'yam bhutva bhavita va na
ajo nityasavato 'yam purano
na hanyate hanyamane sarire

This is neither born nor does This die, nor having
once come into being, cease to become any more:
Unborn, perpetual, eternal is This Ancient One. It is
not killed on the killing of the body.

As indicated in the metre itself, the words here attain a
new height of sublimity. Except for one hidden phrase, the
words do not require much explanation. Na yam bhutva
bhavita va na bhuyah (once considered existent, it does not 
become again so). Reincarnation in the popular sense is
seen to be ruled out. Eternal life seems to be what is meant
here. The Self is never born and never dies. It is pure being
in itself, not subject to any process of evolution, flux or
becoming.
The epithets ajah (unborn) and puranah (ancient) cannot
strictly be reconciled logically, but such apparent
contradictions as we have said, fit into the style of the Gita.

21
veda 'vinasam nityam
ya enam ajam avyayam
katham sa purushah partha
kam ghatayati hanti kam

About him who knows This as the indestructible, the everlasting,
the unborn, never-decreasing one (of) such a person how could
(the questions) ' whose death he causes', 'whom he kills' (arise)
0 Partha (Arjuna)?

This verse finalizes the position of Arjuna as belonging to a
context of wisdom rather than of action - so as to bring the

131
subject into conformity with the major part of the Gita,
which is mainly a dialogue of philosophical import.
Krishna in effect tells Arjuna here that the question of
killing does not obtrude into the situation at all. Arjuna is
considered as a contemplative and not as a warrior any
more. He has no longer any one-sided agency in the matter
of killing. The full purpose or import of such a verse will
become evident if we remember that the samkhya-yoga of
this chapter is more than plain samkhya which is revalued
here. The term purusha (spirit) is purposely employed here
as implying the purusha (spirit) of samkhya philosophy,
unitively equated to a wise man.

22
vasamsi jirnani yatha vihaya
navani grihnati naro 'parani
tatha sarirani vihaya jirnany
anyani samyati navani dehi

As a man casting off his worn-out garments assumes others
that are new,- likewise casting off bodies that are worn-out,
the embodied one takes to others that are new.

Here we have a rather picturesque description often
quoted in support of reincarnation. The over-simplicity of
the picture is excusable only because of the necessity for
rhapsodic singing as the Gita is primarily meant to be. On
closer examination we find that the popular view of
reincarnation is not directly supported here - although
semblance of such support may be found elsewhere and to
which we shall come in due course. It is not spirit actively
entering into) matter, it is rather matter being put aside as it
clings on to spirit by force of necessity again and again. If
we note the complementary aspect of this theory of
supposed reincarnation in xv, 8, we find it is not any
individual soul but Ishvara (the Deity) that reincarnates.
Between the two-faced implications of these two verses (ii,
22 and xv, 8) the case for a veritable theory of
reincarnation, spoken of usually as a doctrine of Hinduism,
has only a very dubious support in the Gita. There are other
verses which seem to suggest and support the usual theory
of reincarnation as popularly held, such as IV, 5, where
Krishna refers to his many past births. Arjuna does not
remember his many births but Krishna does. The
implications of such a difference

132                   
between Arjuna and Krishna are many. In fact the Gita,
which speaks of an everlasting soul so graphically in this
verse ii, 22, seems to contradict itself very definitely in ii,
27, where it says just the converse of the proposition,
namely, "a person who is born is sure to die" etc. Between
everlasting life and an intermittent existence there are
different theories of reincarnation which have all to be
studied individually and fitted into a general scheme to give
a true and sufficiently respectable picture of reincarnation as
it is to be understood in the proper sense of brahmavidya
(the science of the Absolute). Puerile theories must be
abandoned so that we may treat this matter with the respect
it deserves. To state the theory of reincarnation in very
simple terms, as when a person speaks of a crow as his
grandfather, would be to detract from the theory as a very
legitimate way of explaining inequality among created
beings. Childish theories of reincarnation, much in vogue,
are repugnant to the Gita. We do not deny, however, that a
pure picture of how matter and spirit get inter-related, more
or less as implied in the Enneads of Plotinus, is still
tenable.

23
nai 'nam chhindanti sastrani
nai 'nam dahati pavakah
na chai 'nam kledayanty apo
na soshayati marutah

Weapons do not cut This, fire does not burn This and water
does not wet This; wind does not dry This:

24
achchhedyo 'yam adahyo yam
akledyo 'soshya eva cha
nityah sarvagatah
sthanur achalo 'yam sanatanaha

Indeed It is uncleavable; It is non-inflammable; It is
unwettable and non-dryable also; everlasting, all-
pervading, stable, immobile; It is eternal.

25        
avyakto 'yam achintyo 'yam
avikaryo 'yam uchyate
tasmad evam viditvai 'nam
na 'nusochitum arhasi

Undefined is It, unthinkable is It, as non-subject to
change is It spoken of - therefore, knowing It as
such, there is no reason for you to feel sorry for It.

133
Lest any materialistic or dualistic notion should still
persist in regard to the Self as envisaged here, these verses
are meant to give to it a purer status in keeping with the
unitive Self as the Absolute.
The self transcends materiality or the elements (verse 23),
becomes eternal (verse 24), and even beyond thought (verse
25) - attaining the reality of pure absolutism as in the
Upanishads such as the Mandukya (verse 7) where the Self
is equated with the chaturtha or turiya (the fourth) state. A
dialectical revaluation of samkhya duality can be seen to run
through these verses that bring immanent and transcendent
together.
With verse 25 the attention of Krishna begins to be given
to the immediate problem of Arjuna's grief, which
Krishna wants to counteract. The apparent change of
subject and style of argument in the verses that
follow, dropping down from the sublime to the
ordinary, is quite consistent with the uniform style
adopted in the Gita of referring to contingent and
necessary, transcendent and immanent aspects of
reality side by side. The key to understand the unity
of Krishna's reasoning from verse 25 onwards up to
verse 38 (which forms one natural section) is the
phrase  "there is no reason for you to feel regret"
which is many times repeated. The samkhya style of
reasoning finds its natural counterpart in down-to-
earth commonsense which is therefore not out of
place here when Krishna has to deal with the
actualities of the situation.

26
Atha chai 'nam nityajatam
nityam va manyase mritam
tathi 'pi tvam mahabaho
nai 'nam sochitum arhasi

Or again if you should hold This to be constantly
ever-born or as constantly ever-dying, even then 0
Mighty-Armed (Arjuna) you have no reason to
regret it.

Here there is a climbing down by way of concession to
Arjuna's possible incapacity to understand the argument in
all its absolutist implications. Krishna adopts an Alternative

134
next-best line of argument which, however, still conforms
to the methodology proper to yoga, though conceding more
to the dualism of samkhya. Though doctrinally accepting
samkhya duality for the sake of argument, the method
employed conforms to the strict requirements of yogic
dialectics. Herein consists the dialectical revaluation of the
Gita to which we have referred. Note that the principle of
continuity is maintained by the use of the word nitya
(eternal) with the Self. Birth and death are treated as twin
aspects that naturally neutralize themselves in the context of
the eternal. Arjuna is just left unaffected by both equally.

Note the reversion to the second person as against the third
person employed in verse 17. This is because in verse 17 a
model rational contemplative was under reference while in
verse 26 here it is Arjuna as a historical personage who is
discussed

27
jatasya hi dhruvo mrityur
dhruvam janma mrtasya
tasmad apariharye 'rthe
na tvam sochitum arhasi

In respect of anyone born, death is certain, and certain
is birth likewise for anyone dead; therefore regarding
something inevitable, you have no reason to feel any regret.

That the same double-sided method of reasoning is valid
even in the domain of sheer necessity, is brought out in
this verse. Death and life are the two counterparts here
which, when unitively understood, should leave Arjuna in
the same position as a contemplative.
But, textually examined this verse seems to contradict
all that has been stated in verses 20 ff earlier,
regarding the eternal nature of the Self. However,
considering the supposition on which the arguments here
are advanced, this contradiction is only apparent and
should be treated together with the previous verse where
there is a saving phrase atha cha (now also, if). The
difference between the Self of verse 20 and that implied
here is not unlike the two theories of relativity (general and
particular) employed by modern writers. This particular
reference is meant to be fitted without contradiction into
the general theory developed earlier. In both cases it is the
methodology of yoga that is the common factor.

135
avyaktadini bhutani
vyaktamadhyani bharata
avyaktanidhanany eva
tatra ka paridevana

Beings have an unmanifested origin and manifested middle
states, 0 Bharata (Arjuna), and again unmanifested
terminations. Where is room for plaint herein?

A slight deflection from the pure position of ajatavada
(doctrine of non-creation) is again, for purposes of
argument, admitted here. Manifestation or the middle stage
referred to here, lends tentative reality to what is otherwise
treated as mere appearance and maya in Vedanta. This is a
concession made to reason as employed by all intelligent
man, which is in keeping with the spirit and scope of this
chapter. The vyakta (manifest) of the samkhya philosophy
proper is not so symmetrically bounded on either side by
the avyakta (unmanifest) as herein postulated. The head
and tail ends of the Samkhya scheme of reality are
represented by purusha (pure spirit) and mulaprakriti (root-
nature, which is synonymous with avyakta, the unmanifest)
respectively. In the event of death or dissolution the three
stages of beginning, middle and end, merge without
differentiation into the new notion of the avyakta
(unmanifest) in the unitive Absolute envisaged here, which
is a numinous factor whose wonder is referred to in the
next verse.

29
ascharyavat pasyati kaschid enam
ascharyavad vadati  tathai'va cha 'nya
ascharyavach chai 'nam anyah srinoti
srutva 'py enam veda na chai 'va kaschit

A certain person sees This as a wonder, likewise another
speaks about This as a wonder. Another hears of It even as a
wonder, but even hearing no one understands This at all.

Here the Gita rises once more to the sublimity of a
mystical song, before descending soon after to the
commonplace, like the flute of a Krishna producing
different notes in succession, but having always the lulling
effect of the same music

136                  
Krishna himself is called Yoga-Isvara (Lord of Yoga) at
the end of the whole work.
"Sees", "speaks" and "hears"are three ways of
appraising the Absolute - and yet, in spite of each, the
Absolute remains a wonder eluding the seeker and not to be
understood in any fixed or static manner as a thing, entity
or intellectual concept. It appears a rather sweeping
statement to say that "nobody understands", but when we
remember that the highest understanding of the Advaita
(non-dualistic doctrine) abolished the duality of subject and
object altogether, this statement is perfectly in keeping with
the final position of Vedanta.

30
dehi nityam avadhyo yam
dehe sarvasya bharata
tasmat sarvani bhutani
na tvam sochitum arhasi

This embodied One within the bodies of all is ever
immune to killing, 0 Bharata (Arjuna). Therefore
in respect of any being you have no reason for regretting.

This verse serves as a punctuation for the section that it
brings to a close. The next section extends to verse 39.
The reference to sarvani bhutani (all beings) lifts the
discussion one degree higher than the purely human and
historical context. Life values are referred to in the most
general terms. Regret in any relativist sense is ruled out
finally whether it applies to individual life or even life in
general.

31
svadharmam api cha 'vekshya
na vikampitum arhasi
dharmyad dhi yuddhach chhreyo 'nyat
kshatriyasa na vidyate

Further having regard also for the pattern of
behaviour natural to you (svadharma) there is no
reason for vacillation, for there could be nothing
more meritorious than a war that is right for a true
fighter (kshatriya).

Matters relating to the personal life of Arjuna are dealt
with by his friend Krishna by way of consoling him. Even
this

137
new section bears a direct relation to the rest of the
theoretical discussion of this chapter inasmuch as the values
implied, whether spiritual, ethical or merely those of
personal honour, are all directly derivable from the main
doctrine of the Absolute.
Honour, the loss of which is equated to death in verse 34,
taken in its usual light outside the context of absolutism,
would seem to lend support to such absurdities as when a
student commits suicide when he fails in an examination.
Honour as a value in the absolutist context is equal to
dishonour seen in the same context, and these are meant to
cancel each other out, leaving the contemplative again on
the neutral ground which belongs to the Absolute. When
honour is equated thus with dishonour and dishonour with
death as in verse 34 below, there is no violation of the
principles of an absolutist way of life that the Gita
consistently upholds.
The much talked-about doctrine of svadharma (conduct
proper to oneself), which is considered by many as one of the
principal doctrinal contributions of the Gita, is referred to for
the first time here. Favourite sociological doctrines of
religious-minded people have seemingly derived support
from this idea. Reserving a fuller discussion of svadharma in
relation to what is called varnashramadharma (familiarly
known as the caste system) when we come to the latter in iv,
13, ix, 32 and xviii, 41, ff. of the Gita, for our present
purposes it is sufficient for us to say that the reference here is
to the position of Arjuna, consistent with his past upbringing
and present position as an actual fighter on the side of the
Pandavas. Svadharma as a general doctrine is to be
distinguished from its particular application to Arjuna in the
given situation. As a general principle it is not far different
from what is known in the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle
where specificity itself is the basis of virtue. If a tree bears
fruit that is proper to its species it is fulfilling its svadharma,
or unfolding its innate character. The virtue of a good cow
may be said to be the quality and quantity of its milk.
Similarly saltiness is proper to salt. Man's humanity
distinguishes the human kind and conforming to human
nature is the basis of virtue or svadharma for man. Socrates
as an Athenian was fulfilling his svadharma when he took up
arms for his city. MacArthur when he bombed Koreans was
fulfilling his svadharma in his own particular context. If he
had refused he would have been just replaced.

138                   
Here the svadharma of an Arjuna who is referred to as a
kshatriya (warrior) is a parallel case. When we see that
Drona is a brahmin-archer whose svadharma is not in the
battlefield, and even Bhishma is primarily a patriarch rather
than a combatant, the reference to kshatriya conduct here
has to be taken with the latitude that we see is being
permitted for the situation.
It is not to a watertight class called kshatriyas that
reference is made here, but to a warrior type of personality
to which. Arjuna as an individual happens to conform.
Moreover Arjuna is not within the aryan fold, strictly
speaking. He was related to the dark-skinned                              
Krishna who was a king of the Vrishnis, some forgotten
and probably heterodox section found south of the
Vindhya mountains. There is no indication elsewhere of the
Aryan origin of the Pandavas ethnologically. The kshatriya-
hood here referred to must therefore pertain merely to a
psycho-physical type and not to a caste, as people easily
tend to understand it.
We have also the glaring case of Krishna himself, who is
not in his svadharma (conduct proper to oneself) as a
charioteer. He is a Guru, a teacher of philosophy who
follows another vocation, not his own, for the time being.
A man is true to his svadharma when he does not
willfully and abruptly break away from his own previous
nature and nurture. Such breaking away in the case of
Arjuna would be if he suddenly desired to become a
mendicant or a samnyasin (renouncer) as hinted at by
himself.
Api cha (also and) occurs again here. This indicates that
the argument is something extra added on to the main
argument, which does not concern itself with svadharma at
all. Such reference is therefore incidental, being merely
meant to console Arjuna.
The word vikampitum, usually interpreted  "to tremble", may
be taken to mean more simply "not to swerve" from the path
chalked out for Arjuna by natural circumstances,.
Note in the second line that the svadharma of Arjuna as a
kshatriya has to tally with the legitimate or righteous
character of the war he is asked to wage, if it is to be
conducive to spiritual progress.
Shreyas (better) : any warfare is not to be waged by a
kshatriya to promote spiritual progress. Conversely, even a
righteous war has to be waged only by a genuine kshatriya
to produce right results. The reciprocal factors thus
coinciding correctly

139
would alone produce a desirable spiritual effect. This is
almost like Cartesian occasionalism in view of the thin
probability involved here. The chance element
(yadrichchhaya) mentioned in the next verse refers to this
very condition. To derive mechanically the dictum that if a
kshatriya should simply fight he would gain merit is an
absurd notion, although very commonly held.

32
yadrichchhaya cho'papannam
svargadvaram apavritam
sukhinah kshatriyah partha
labhante yuddham idrisam

True warriors (kshatriyas) have reason to be
happy too) 0 Partha (Arjuna) to have the chance of
such a war presenting itself unsought before them
as an open door to heaven.

The idea here is complementary to that of the previous
verse. The door of heaven opens before the warrior who is a
true kshatriya without any exertion or active seeking on his
part. This only underlines the element of occasionalism
which alone favours spiritual progress.
In the actual war that we know in this case in which
Arjuna is involved, there is no absolutely clear line of
righteousness discernible. In fact it is not even a true "war".
It is worse than even a civil war, being a family feud. To
speak of righteous warfare here could have but one
meaning, that it is a war where absolutist spiritual values
are involved. We may suppose that it is righteous because
Arjuna and Krishna are interested in absolutism, while
Drona and Bhishma, who are the best of the Kurus,
represent only one form or another of relativist spirituality.
This is what makes this particular warfare so rare and
happy according to Krishna in this verse. Arjuna does not
go to heaven though there is reference to the gate of heaven
open or him. He was not admitted into a relativistic heaven,
though Duryodhana was, as we read at the end of the
Mahabharata story. Arjuna must have attained to
something higher, in keeping with the value he represented.
in the war.

140
33
atha chet tvam imam dharmyam
samgramam na karishyasi
tatah svadharmam kirtim cha
hitad papam avapyasi

If, on the other hand, you will not take to this
battle which conforms to the requirements of
righteousness, then thwarting what is consistent
with your own nature and your good repute you
will become involved in evil.

There is reference on the part of Krishna to papa (sin). This
was exactly what Arjuna feared (i, 45) and for which he
was decried by Krishna.
Now what exact connotation should be given to this word
sin? This question becomes more difficult to answer when
we see that later on the teaching of the Gita is for
transcending both sin and virtue, both bad and good, as we
find even as early as verse 50 in this same chapter.
The sin referred to here must therefore be to the form of
regret or negative state of diffidence from which Arjuna
himself suffered a moment ago. It is clear at least that sin here
does not allude to any cardinal aspect of the Gita teaching.
Disqualification for full moksha (liberation) and lapsing into
samsara (relativistic life) are referred to often as the worst
disaster, rather than sin, which is a vague term used by
religious people only. Krishna uses Arjuna's expression as
Arjuna himself might use it, for the sake of clarity.
The nature of the sin is suggested in that Arjuna would
contradict his own nature and spoil his reputation, thus
lapsing into regret which describes the state of mind of a
sinner.
The word dharmyam (what accords with one's true nature)
is again stressed for reasons already indicated. In other
words the war must be willed by God if it is to be fought so
as to be free from sin. Omission of such a war is the sin here
as it defeats the will of God, to put it in the usual language
of Christian theology. In this rare case, not killing becomes
sin, rather than killing, which latter all religions hold to be
sinful. It is a special kind of sin of omission and not of
commission. The religious notion of sin is not refuted here.
It remains intact in its own proper context (x, 5). It is not the
subject of discussion here at all. The "kill not" of the
Jewish commandments, of Christianity and Buddhism, do
not suffer therefore by any teaching of the Gita. Gandhian
ahimsa (non-hurting) belonging to Jainism would have
remained

141
equally intact, if he had not sought support to explain it in
the light of an arbitrary understanding of the teaching of the
Gita. (e.g. "Thus the author of the Gita, by extending
meaning of words has taught us to imitate him. Let it be
granted that according to the letter of the Gita it is possible
to say that warfare is consistent with renunciation of fruit.
But after forty years' unremitting endeavour fully to enforce
the teaching of the Gita in my own life I have in all
humility, felt that perfect renunciation is impossible without
perfect observance of ahimsa in every shape and form."
P 130, The Gita According  to Gandhi by Mahadev Desai,
Ahmedabad 1946).

34
akirtim cha 'pi bhutani
kathayishyanti te 'vyayam
sambhavitasya cha 'kirtir
maranad atirichyate

Living beings will also pronounce a never-ending verdict of
calumny on you, and to one used to honour, dishonour is
worse than death.

35
bhayad ranad uparatam
mamsyante tvam maharathah
yesham cha tvam bahumato
bhutva yasyasi laghavam

The great car-generals will look upon you as quitting the
battle from fear and having been honourably looked upon by
them you will be held in derision.

36
avachyavadams cha bahun
vadishyanti tava'hitah
nindantas tava samarthyam
tato duhkhataram nu kim

Those against you will speak of you in unspeakable terms,
scorning your ability; what pain could there be keener than
this?

In these three verses there is reference to very commonplace
values not generally alluded to as religious or even
spiritual. In verse 34 honour is the value involved.

142                   
How honour is precious to a warrior on the battlefield is 
easily understandable and has already been touched upon in
the previous verse. The samkhya philosophers were heterodox
rationalists who were not specially religious. In this chapter
where such a school of samkhya is under reference, the
personal values such as honour, ill-repute and shame, to
which Arjuna is likely to be exposed by backing out of the
battlefield at the eleventh hour, are just those legitimate
and normal values in whose name he could be appealed to.
It is true that in other chapters we find the Gita clearly
teaching a neutral indifference to reputation, shame or
public opinion (xii,19; xiv, 24, 25 etc). The place given to
shame, reputation and honour in the three separate verses so
prominently here is to be understood as normal to a
complete enumeration of personal values that legitimately
belong to the rationalist realism of the samkhya school.
Rationalism itself is a form of agnostic attitude where 
"here and now" aspects of life are given a large place.
Further, the dishonour or disrepute mentioned in verse 34
comes from the whole world of created beings, as implied
in the expression bhutani (creatures). Life itself,
philosophically understood in the context of rationalism, is
a constant going forward, a forward flowing flux or
becoming. The "sin" of verse 33 implies, as we have said,
a regression or set-back in this forward flow of life. The
vital energy in all creatures may be said to make life
always play a forward game. Sulkiness, when one is in the
thick of a game or a battle, amounts to a deliberate act of
obstruction of the normal forward flow of events. Any
backing out of the situation in which Arjuna found himself
would amount to a violence towards life itself understood
in negative philosophical terms as with the samkhyas.
Negation has therefore no place in the scheme of values of
a rationalist as understood within the scope of this chapter.
As a real soldier on the battlefield Arjuna is here called
upon to recognize the need for safeguarding his own
personal reputation. Soon, however, the tone changes even
in this section of the chapter, as we see in verse 38 below,
just before the chapter passes on to the orthodox pragmatic
form of yoga after verse 39.

143
37
hato va prapsyasi svargam
jitva va bhokshyase mahim
tasmad uttishtha kaunteya
yuddhaya kritanischayah

Dying you will attain heaven or winning you will have the
enjoyment of the earth. Therefore arise, 0 Kaunteya
(Arjuna), making up your mind to fight.

38
sukhadukhe same kritva
labhalabhau jayajayau
tato yuddhaya yujyasva
nai 'vam papam avapsyasi

Equalizing both pleasure and pain, both gain and loss,
both victory and defeat, enter wholly into battle. Thus
you will avoid sin.

These two verses are intended to round off the samkhya
position as revalued in the Gita, before switching over to
buddhi-yoga (dialectics of pure reason). The dialectical
method is again used. In verse 37 note that the gain is
double. When Arjuna's reason was clouded by his
emotions, he tried to apply the same dialectical method in
xi, 5, where he imagined two disasters falling on himself.
Here the same dialectics properly applied result in gain
both here and hereafter. When applied to values that were
of earth we had a doubly negative conclusion. Here heaven
is introduced and doubly positive values emerge.
In the light of the fact that Arjuna did not desire heaven
at all, nor even earthly joys, these words of Krishna should
be taken as giving an example of how to apply dialectical
reason correctly to a given situation and consciously to set
it off against the negative dialectics of Arjuna which is
based on wrong values. Krishna is just teaching him a
method and not asking him to desire heaven or worldly
gains. It would be inconsistent to think that Krishna would
teach Arjuna to desire a relativistic heaven when Arjuna's
own position has been stated in ii, 8, quite emphatically in a
manner more in keeping with the superior doctrine of the
Gita. For a Guru to be inferior in outlook to the disciple on
such a subject would be totally untenable even on the basis
of any adhikari-bheda (differences in the rights of persons
to claim higher knowledge) sometimes advanced.        
Such an interpretation would be repugnant to the structure
of the Upanishads on which the Gita itself relies.
The verse terminates with the milder admonition to
"stand up" with a firm conviction, rather than "to fight"

144                 
by sheer necessity, as in ii, 18. The keenness of actual
necessity gives place to the need for an intellectual resolve.
It is the need for spiritual reorientation which emerges to
the forefront.
In verse 38 an example is given where dialectics is
employed quite properly, rid of the dualism still adhering
to the samkhya way of reasoning. The counterparts are
brought closer together. We find a central place given to
the avoidance of papa (sin) or evil, which obscured
Arjuna's mind much in i, 45. Everything is set and ready
for buddhi-yoga (the dialectics of pure reason) to be
discussed.
The word same (equal) alludes to the chief prerequisite      
of yoga, as stated in verse 48 of this same chapter.

39       
esha te 'bhihita  samkhye
buddhir yoge tv imam srinu
buddhya yukto yaya partha
karmabandham prahasyasi

What has just been taught is reason according to samkhya;
but hear now of the same according to yoga, attaining to
the unity of which reasoning you will be able to throw
off the bondage of works.

That there are two sections in this chapter and that there
is a certain relation between them, we have already
mentioned. The line of demarcation between the two
sections is most explicitly mentioned here, beyond any
question of doubt. There is a buddhi or reasoning which has
been discussed so far. It conforms to the model or pattern of
the samkhya philosophy; and there is another buddhi which
employs a method and follows a line of thought in keeping
with a more orthodox tradition. The last verse of this
chapter distinguishes the second way or state of thought by
the word brahmi (pertaining to the Absolute). The notion of
brahman (the Absolute) has its affiliations to the Vedas.
Hence it is that we have called the second way as conforming
to a more orthodox tradition.
It has been generally admitted on the part of scholars (e.g.,
Edgerton and Radhakrishnan) that the samkhya here is not
the same as the samkhya system known to us from Kapila's
time. The yoga of the latter half of this chapter does not
conform either to the pattern of Patanjali's yoga system.

145
In trying to bring out the unity of structure of the whole
chapter Radhakrishnan suggests there is an adaptation here
to "Gita theism "(P 1. the Bhagavad Gita, 1948) .
In this chapter at least there is nothing which could be
taken to be even approaching theism. The word Ishvara or
Lord does not occur in this chapter. Elsewhere, however,
the word does occur. We should particularly note that in
xviii 61, Krishna does not refer to himself as an Ishvara, but
refer to an Ishvara in the third person, as if outside himself
- Krishna being the absolute and not a deity in the theistic
sense. Then, in iv, 6, Krishna, it is true, does refer to
himself as Ishvara, but here it is among other more or less
important roles that lordship is mentioned incidentally as
the word api (also) indicates. In xv, 8, Ishvara is used as
synonymous with the reincarnating Self and in xv, 17,
Ishvara is unmistakably identified once again with the
Absolute. The word Ishvara should not mislead us into any
idea of theism at all. Ishatva (lordliness) is one of the
siddhis (powers) of a yogi, according to Patanjali, and in
these last two references, Ishvara means human attributes
akin to leadership. Therefore the meaning of Ishvara as
used in the Gita will be seen to range between the idea of
the Absolute and the mere attribute of a leader. The static
notion of a theistic god like Vishnu is repugnant to the spirit
in which the whole Gita has been conceived. Dr. Lacombe
points out: "Vishnu also as in Vedic texts, passes from a
subordinate rank to a supreme rank. His identification with
Narayana and with Vasudeva took place at epic periods
posterior to the composition of the Gita" (translated, p. 26,
L'Absolu Selon le Vedanta,Paris, 1937).

It is clear from xv, 19 that a theistic approach to reality
is ruled out altogether. Krishna represents there the
Purushottama (the Highest of the High) which concept is
different from that of an Ishvara or Lord, since
Purushottama stands for the pure Absolute. Krishna is
against himself being looked upon as having a human form, 
as seen in ix, xi. Any semblance of support for the theism
referred to by Radhakrishnan must be derived, if at all, from
Chapter xii where, in verse 5, the Gita recommends the path
of the manifested as being easier than the pursuit of the
unmanifested, but in the very same chapter amends are made
for this preference on the score of easiness only, by a
concluding verse specially intended for the purpose of
straightening any wrong impression on this matter. We shall

146
give this closer scrutiny in its proper place, but in the
expression dharmyamritam (righteous and everlasting value)
the value implied is far from suggesting any theism. If some
scholars still think that the Gita is a religious book
belonging to a particular form of theism, the only other
semblance of support, perhaps, is chapter xi, where the
Vishvarupa Darshana (Vision of the Cosmic Form) is
wrongly treated as a theophany, or manifestation of God.
Many western critics, like Prof. R.Otto of Marburg, have
fallen into this error, which is not strange. But for Indians
like Radhakrishnan to make this mistake is perhaps too
much to leave unnoticed. Brahmavidya (the science of the
Absolute) should not be confused with mere religious
theism, and the distinction between the nature of the Vishva-
rupa (cosmic form) and a merely religious worship of
Vishnu should be patent to anyone who scrutinizes xi, 48.
Arjuna himself, not capable of being an absolutist in the full
sense intended in the Gita, pleads for a lesser vision in xi,
46, which perhaps might conform to theism, but Krishna did
not grant that prayer. Instead he just revealed his ordinary
form as stated in xi, 50. He refused to reveal himself as any
theistic or conventional God of any religious group.
In the concluding part of the Gita (xviii, 66) the final point
to this view that the Gita has no religious message at all, is
found in the words sarvadharman parityajya (abandoning all
religious duties). The Gita is a philosophical work and treats
of Brahmavidya, which has nothing to do with theism or
religion as such.
The second half of Chapter ii has been characterized in ii,
72 as pertaining to brahmi sthitih (the state of the Absolute).
The unity of the two sections in this chapter can be under-
stood when we consider them (I) as samkhya revalued in the
first half of the chapter and (2) the more rational tradition of
the orthodox schools of thought which prevailed prior to the
Gita, as also similarly revalued in the second half of the
chapter. What gives further unity and justifies the general
title of Samkhya-Yoga (Unitive Reasoning) as applied to
both the sections together, is that both represent revaluations
of rationalism (heterodox and orthodox) dialectically, i.e.,
according to a methodology particular to yoga, "as we shall
see from the definitions and instances of yoga given in the
verses to follow. No doubt is left about samkhya and yoga
being the same, by v, 4-5, so that the title of this chapter
could cover both even in advance already and justify the

147
synthetic way of referring to the two aspects of this chapter
together as one "Samkhya-Yoga ".
In this particular verse the terms "buddhi (reason)
according to samkhya "and "buddhi (reason) according to
yoga" are referred to. The latter is really none other than
buddhi-yoga (dialectics of pure reason). Buddhi (reason) is a
human value capable of being discussed (I) under heterodox
rationalism known to the samkhya school revalued as a
yoga and (2) under orthodox Vedism to which rationalistic
norms could be applied to conform again to the requirements
of a yoga. verse ii, 39 demarcates the two sections inclusively
named Samkhya-Yoga as having to do with the Absolute.
Karmabandham (bondage of works) is an evil, one degree
milder than papa (sin) of the previous verse. The remedy for
this bondage suggested here is to be yoked to buddhi (pure
reason) - thus to be "yoked to buddhi "is an interchangeable
term with buddhiyoga.
The demarcation line between the two sections becomes
very clear by the placing of the word tu (well, now then!).

40       
ne 'ha 'bhikramanaso 'sti
pratyavayo na vidyate
svalpam apy asya dharmasya
trayate mahato bhayat

In such (a path) there is no forfeiture of any merit
nor is there involved any demerit by transgression.
Even a little of such a way of life saves one from great
apprehension.

This verse begins the section which is described at the
very end of this chapter by the words brahmi sthitih (the
state of spirit in accordance with the notion of the Absolute).
The word Brahman we know already has its origin in the
brahminical or Vedic context and thus refers back to the
orthodox schools of Vedism, as opposed to the heterodox
rationalist schools of the previous half of this chapter.
Naturally, therefore, this verse begins by contrasting the
merely orthodox Vedism with Brahmavidya (the science of
the Absolute) as intended in the Gita.
Relativistic Veda is here contrasted with absolutist
Vedanta. The progressive accumulation of merit, or
regression into demerit, are both irrelevant to spirituality as
it should be

148                 
understood in Vedanta. Although Vedanta has no dharma
so-called, or as absolutism is beyond all dharmas (which
implications of the relativist world), here we find the
reference to dharma is merely for purposes of contrast
with relativist duties which are full of injunctions and
obligations. It is usual in the same sense to speak
sometimes of upanishadsudharmah (dharma as implied in
the Upanishads). In the light of the final recommendation
to abandon all dharmas (xviii, 66), the non-obligatory
character of the dharma here becomes evident, Relativist
dharma is open to two dangers which are referred to here.
After building up merit, a slight deflection from
or error of obligatory conduct could jeopardize the whole
progress made, at any stage, at any given moment, not only
nullifying all merit, but prospectively and adversely
affecting generations still unborn, in the family of the
defaulter.
These two dangers are referred to in the terms
abhikramanasah (destruction of what is gradually built up)
and pratyavaya (negation of what should have accrued).
By contrast, absolutist wisdom is safe sailing, as we shall
see from the quotation below from the Mundaka
Upanishad. All Upanishads invariably begin their teaching
of absolutist wisdom by first referring to Vedic or relativist
wisdom often in seemingly laudatory terms, but soon to
damn it with faint praise, pointing out its dangers. This is a
favourite device in Samskrit and is known as virodhabhasa.
The fear referred to here should also be understood in the
light of the danger in all relativist forms of spiritual
progression which belong to the Vedic context.
The words svalpam api (even a little) suggest those
biblical sayings which also refer to wisdom, such as "a little
leaven leaveneth the whole lump", "the still small voice,"
and the pearl of great price,"etc.
The nature of the pratyavaya (negation of what should
have accrued) referred to becomes clear from the following
quotation from the Mundaka Upanishad (1, 2, 3):
"If one's Agnihotra (Vedic burnt offering) sacrifice is
not followed by the sacrifice of the new moon and of the
full moon, by the four-months sacrifice, by the harvest
sacrifice, if it is unattended by guests, or not offered at
all, or without the ceremony to all the gods, or not
according to rule, it destroys his seven worlds."

41
vyavasayatmika buddhir
eke 'ha kurunandana
bahusakha hy anantas cha
buddhayovyavasayinam

Here, 0 Prize of the Kurus (Arjuna), the well-founded
reasoning is unitive but many branched and endless are
the reasonings of them in whom reason is ill-founded.

The basic requirements for buddhi (reasoning) to
function in manner conducive to attain spiritual values is
here referred as being unitive or uniate. Unitive thinking
alone is the proper instrument of contemplation. It
follows certain vyavasthas or rules of arrangement which
properly belong to its method of achieving worthwhile
values in life treated as a whole. One has to desire
spiritual values wholeheartedly according to certain
attitudes proper to the context of wisdom. Such unitive
well-founded reasoning is here referred to as vasayatmika
buddhi (a reason well-founded and regulated and directed
to its object). Such a reasoning establishes a direct bi-
polar relationship with the object of its search. It does not
get lost in endless ramifications. Bi-polarity, once
established, is conducive to further reasoning along the
same lines, culminating in the highest good, in the Self.
This, we shall see, is the basic doctrine of the Gita. This
bi-polar method which consists of resolving duality
implicit in it at every stage is none other than the method
of yoga, as employed  throughout the Gita.
Dialectics when understood properly in Western
philosophy would come nearest to this method of yoga.
In the Introduction and elsewhere, wherever the subject
arises, further clarification of dialectics will be found.

42
yam imam pushpitam vacham
pravadanty avipaschitah
vedavadaratah partha
na'nyad asti 'ti vadinah

43
kanatatmanah svargapara
janma karma phala
pradam kriya visesha
bahulam
bhogaisvaryagatim prati

150

44
bhogaisvarya prasaktanam
taya'pahritchetasam
vyavasayatmika buddhih
samadhau na vidhiyate

Such flowery speech as uttered by the foolish
adhering to the doctrine of the Veda negating any
other (transcendental) verity, the self of which is
nothing but desire-made, holding heaven for
highest goal, offering only birth as the result of
works abounding in many special observances
which aim at enjoyment and domination:
in the case of those whose minds are under the
sway of such teachings, who are attached to
enjoyment and domination, a well-founded reason
does not come under the sway of the peace of
contemplation (samadhi).

45      
traigunya vishaya veda
nistraigunyo bhava 'rjuna
nirdvandvo nitya sattvastho
niryogakshema atmavan

The Veda treats of matters related to the three
gunas (modalities of nature); you should he free
from these three modalities 0 Arjuna; free from
(relative) pairs of opposites, established ever in
pure being, without any yoga (discipline) or well-
being (as dual factors, but remain) one (unitively)
Self-possessed (atmavan).

46
yavan artha udapane    
sarvatah samplutodake
tavan sarveshu vedeshu
brahmanasya vijanatah

There would be as much use for all the Vedas to a
Brahmin of wisdom as there could be for a pool of
water when a full flood prevails all over.

These verses must be taken together. They unequivocally
continue a tirade against Vedism. The relativism of Vedic
spirituality is here condemned as being non-conducive to
the

151
turning of the mind to samadhi (final peace, emancipation,
the highest goal).
The method of reasoning that Vedic-minded people
employ is also here discredited in unmistakable terms. It is
usual however, on the part of apologists in the name of
Hindu orthodoxy to condone or take away the edge from
this forthright condemnation. Here in verse 46, the Vedas
are referred to as a useless old well. Condemnation of this
kind is further repeated elsewhere in the Gita. The tree that
the Veda-knower knows is to be ruthlessly cut down in xv,
1-3.
Radhakrishnan, for example, as one such apologist, refers
to the Vedic ritualists as of this verse or "Vedic Aryans "
as he calls them, as "glorious children the youth of humanity
whose life was still fresh and sweet" - yet who "had
also the balanced wisdom of maturity." (The Bhagavad Gita,
P. 117). He does not say however, that they were mistaken
according to the Gita.
In their eagerness to save the Vedas in the name of orthodoxy,
such writers forget that to the extent that relativism
is connived at, the true cause of Vedanta, which is perhaps
a superior heritage for all mankind, suffers by such apologetics.
The rishis (seers or sages) stood for absolutist wisdom first and
foremost, while giving to relativist knowledge all possible credit
due to it. For anyone to try to out-do the rishis themselves in the
name of any Hindu apologetics whatsoever, with which certain
elements of patriotism and nationalism are also likely to be
mixed, would be indirectly a disservice to that very heritage
which Paul Deussen describes as "the fairest flower on the tree
of Indian wisdom."
In verse 42 the word vedavadaratah (those attached to Vedic
reasoning) is often apologetically translated as referring only
to karma kanda (ritualistic section) of the Vedas, although it
plainly refers here to those who are attached to an argument
which is one-legged, or which is a form of reasoning that is
non-dialectical, and peculiar to the Vedas and not to the
Vedanta.
That such a meaning as we give is intended is clear from
the next qualifying phrase in the same verse: na aniyad asti
iti vadinah (those who contend there is no second side to a
given argument). Vedantic thought conforms to a pattern of
reasoning which has two counterparts, which is exactly
what is known from early Greek times in the West as
dialectical reasoning.

152                  
That yoga is essentially the same as dialectical reasoning
the succeeding verses will soon reveal.
In verse 43 the word svargaparah (those for whom
heaven is the supreme value) would seem at first sight to
contradict what was just said in verse 49 where the ritualists
are represented as thinking with undue emphasis on one
side of life. Svarga (heaven) brought in here might seem to
compensate for this one-sidedness, but in reality the heaven
of the ritualist is only a form of an "earthly paradise"
where the same pleasures that are understood on earth could
be prolonged. Indra, for example, is steeped in such
pleasures. Such a heaven, non-dialectically conceived, is
repugnant to the teaching of the Gita, although this does not
mean that higher human values properly understood are
excluded. This will be clear from iii, 11, where there is a
reference to a properly contemplative give and take
between man and gods as reciprocal counterparts of the
same situation as revised in Vedanta.
The phrase janma-karma-phala-pradam (yielding fruits of
action through births) can refer to superior or inferior
relativist values, but both the result and the action are
conceived as lying within the relativistic scheme. Further the
"fruit" here is a third factor incompatible with either ends or
means. Therein lies the absurdity of the Vedic way,
confusing the mind of the seeker because of the triangular
situation involved. Bi-polarity of interest, which is a pre-
requisite for yogic reasoning is thus violated. Hence the
ritualistic injunctions become endlessly complicated and
entangled. This is what is suggested in the next phrase : kriya
visesha bahulam (abounding in ritualistic speculations).

In verse 44, the phrase tayi apahrita-chetasam (faculties
dominated by such factors), refers to what we have
distinguished above as the third intrusive interest,
lopsidedly conceived. For samadhi (final peace) to result, it
is essential that energies should not be dissipated in third
interests which fall outside the scope of spirituality, for
spiritual progress takes place only through a direct bi-polar
relationship.
Of reasoning it is said here na vidhiyate (will not bend).
Reasoning will not bend or submit to progressive
sublimation in terms of higher and higher interests or values
to the extent that the bipolarity is interfered with.
In verse 45 the relativistic character of the Vedas is further
elaborated. The highest point of perfection envisaged
according

153
to Vedic teaching is a brahmin of sattvic (pure)nature.
Arjuna is called upon to desire something better still, which
is to be got only by a thorough-going Absolutist
The categoric nature of the injunction to Arjuna to discard 
altogether the relativist  standpoint is made quite                           
clear in the phrase nistraigunyo bhava'rjuna (transcend the
three modalities of nature, Arjuna). just as crabbed age and
youth cannot live together, so with relativism and
absolutism. To think that karma (action) and jnana
(wisdom) are recommended together here as some lukewarm
apologists tend to think is exactly what Sankara calls the
error of jnana-karma-samuchchhaya (commingling of
wisdom and work) against which he has fought many a
battle in various parts of his bhashyas commentaries).
The revised attitude proper to the outlook of Vedanta is
summed up in the second line of the same verse:
nirdvandvah (not based on pairs of opposites, e.g., pleasure
and pain), nityasattvastho (established in timeless or pure
being). It is true that the word sattva (referring to pure
being) is common to Vedic and Vedantic ways of life, but
the prefix nitya (timeless) lifts it out of the framework of
relativism altogether. It does not refer to the social quality,
holiness or purity of a ritualistic brahmin, who is the highest